THE FALSE PROMISE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: This is a couple of weeks old, but it's one of my pet gripes:
The Economist reckons that the "new judicial activism" David Blunkett has recently been complaining about is:
"for those, like this newspaper, who think that the British constitution (or lack of it) endows the executive with too much power, ... a welcome development. Britain's judiciary is a pale shadow of that in countries with written constitutions, such as America, where the Supreme Court constantly scrutinises the actions of the executive and the legislature in the light of the constitution. But the growing assertiveness of Britain's judges is an indication that things are moving in the right direction. The crosser Mr Blunkett gets, the better."
Many in New Zealand might express similar sentiments (though the same kind of executive-judicial standoff as has occured in Britain has yet to manifest itself here). However, in doing so both they, and
The Economist fall into an all too familiar trap, referred to by economists as the 'nirvana fallacy'.
The argument for judicial activism essentially runs as follows:
(1) Governments sometimes make 'bad' decisions.
(2) When they do, judges should step in and stop them.
The problem with this is that it assumes, without analysis (a) that judges will make fewer 'bad' decisions than governments; and (b) that no alternative oversight institutions (such as Parliament) will make fewer 'bad' decisions than judges. In fact, there is a good deal to suggest that we should not be so sanguine in our estimations of curial competence: judges make bad decisions too. In the US (which is held up as a shining example by
The Economist) judges have been complicit in some of the most grievous governmental rights breaches (see e.g.
Korematsu v US). Moreover, in a system that gives power to the judiciary, judges can overrule 'good' decisions with 'bad':
The Economist itself has noted the way Supreme Court interference has distorted the abortion debate in the US (see
"The war that never ends").
In making the assessment between judges and democratically elected representatives, it bears emphasising that most of the issues we are talking about here are not susceptible of easy answers: striking the 'right' balance between citizens' civil rights and the nation's security (to take Mr. Blunkett's example) is a difficult task. Many (myself included) would go so far as to argue that such problems have no 'correct' solution at all. These are precisely the sorts of issues that are best dealt with by a democratic process of compromise, and (where that fails) majority will. Yet arguments for greater activism on the part of a small coterie of unelected judges lead us in precisely the opposite direction.
The Economist's diagnosis of a too-powerful executive may be correct, but the suggested cure - which amounts to replacing it with a too-powerful judiciary - is too simplistic. In moderation, a little judicial activism may be warranted (particularly if confined to the protection of democratic and minority rights, which governments are perhaps more likely to trample). But in general, a better solution would involve more democracy, not less.
Proportional representation anybody?