A QUICK OVERVIEW OF STUPID THINGS FROM THE LAST FEW DAYS/WEEKS:
Stupid Thing #1 (for Craig - sorry it took so long)
Helen Clark
criticising a Maori Land Court judge for not recusing herself in a case in which she was interested. To be fair, I think Helen's probably right on the substance - the judge should not have involved herself in a matter in which she was obviously biased. The question, though, is whether that justifies breaking with the convention that politicians do not criticise the judiciary. Margaret Wilson is right to
suggest that there may be cases that justify a breach of the convention, but this is not one of them.
There are strong reasons for the rule that politicians do not criticise judges, and they should not be departed from lightly: that a case is "unusual" is not enough. The impartiality of the judiciary and its isolation from political pressure is too important a value to be cast aside for political gain. Of course, Helen's argument here is that she was attempting to uphold the impartiality of the judiciary by pointing out a conflict of interest. But there is no reason why this needed to be carried out in the public domain as it has been. Instead, the appropriate course would seem to me to be to seek to judicially review the judge's decision - not to attempt to play the issue out in the media.
Stupid Thing #2
There may be good reasons for opposing fines that increase with income, but, pace NZ First justice spokesperson Ron Mark, the idea that
it's inconsistent with "one law for all" is not one of them. As I've pointed out in
a previous post:
"equality" is a very messy idea, that can in fact lead you to just about any policy prescription imaginable. It all comes down to the question "equality of what?" To take a simple example, equality could be conscripted in defence of a wide variety of tax regimes depending on what you want to equalise: equality in the absolute amount of tax paid = poll tax; equality in proportion of income paid as tax = flat tax rate; equality in after tax income = 100% tax on all income above $X.
Likewise, equal dollar value fines, fines of an equal percentage of income, or fines that leave people with an equal amount of money after paying it are all "equal". There's a pretty good argument that what you're concerned with here is equal deterrent value, for which income-related fines would seem a decent proxy. Stephen Franks is right to suggest
that wealth is a better proxy - but that's not necessarily an argument against income-based fines. If you accept Franks' argument that we don't have the data to issue wealth-based fines, then the fact that they're better than income indexing becomes irrelevant. The question is whether income related fines are better than the current system, which I think there's a good case they are. Suggesting you should pick the worst option because the best one isn't available seems pretty odd reasoning to me.
Stupid Thing #3
Commenting on the High Court injunction issued today to prevent the release of comparisons between New Zealand and British universities,
Bill English says:
If the information is found not to have been of sufficient quality to compare New Zealand universities with their British counterparts then serious questions must be asked about the integrity of the processes that have been used... It seems that the Tertiary Education Commission has not analysed their data in a way that is robust enough to bear international comparison. If the data collected for these rankings is not up to scratch then the whole methodology of the TEC is thrown into doubt.
On its face, this might seem fair. But it's not. Notice how there is no substantive criticism of the PBRF methodology anywhere in Bill's comments. He's not pointing out anything wrong with the PBRF methodology, which you'd have thought he'd have had plenty of time to do before now if he actually had any problem with it. Rather, he's suggesting that because we can't directly compare it with the British system, it must, somehow be flawed because it doesn't stand up to international comparison.
As anyone who has any sort of experience with data should know, there are lots of equally valid ways to measure things, that are not necessarily the same: for example, in rankings of research "quality" for example, a great deal often turns on the precise weighting assigned to publication in the very top tier of journals. Change this slightly, and your results can vary massively. Yet there's often no particular reason to think that one weighting is inherently better than another. They're just different. Second, even if you assume (wrongly) that the fact that measures aren't comparable means one of them is shoddy, there's little reason to believe that it's ours. It could easily be the Brits'. (In fact there are a number of areas where the way New Zealand regulation is arguably better than most of the rest of the world, but we lose out for being different.)
Stupid Thing #4
This article in which slate senior editor Dahlia Lithwick calls a recently introduced
bill that would allow congress to overrule Supreme Court decisions by a 2/3 majority "dumb", and completely fails to back up here position (Link via the
Volokh Conspiracy). Let's be clear, if this Bill somehow managed to pass it could lead to one of the biggest changes in the balance of power between the arms of government in the US ever, and it's far from clear it's a good idea. But it's certainly not "dumb". In fact, it's pretty similar to the Canadian system, which allows Parliament to override judicial rulings made under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (Although some Americans might regard that as further evidence of the proposal's dumbness, I assume most readers of this blog will not.)
As
I've argued before, it's far from obvious that courts will systematically make better decisions than democratic legislatures on rights issues. (At the very least it's something that is open to reasonable debate.) And there is certainly nothing in the US Constitution that conclusively says that the courts were intended to be its ultimate guardians - they took that upon themsleves, of their own accord, in
Marbury v Madison. On this basis, a proposal that allows a legislative override, subject to a 2/3 majority seems a reasonable way of safeguarding rights. (Bear in mind that achieveing a 2/3 majority is no small feat.) Indeed, it's essentially the same standard as applies to legislative overrides of Presidential vetos (which
some argue, in an interesting parallel, were originally intended only to be exercised when the President thought Congress had acted outside its constitutional authority).
Nonetheless, while I am sympathetic to the Bill, I do think there are a number of problems with it. Although not fatal, the likelihood that it would get struck down by the Supreme Court, even if passed by Congress, might make it seem preferable that such a result be achieved by amending the Constitution, rather than ordinary legislation (which suffers from the additional flaw that it could be repealed by a simple legislative majority). Moreover, though I am (obviously) not an American Constitutional Law expert, I suspect there are parts of the Constitution, other than the Bill of Rights, which
are better left to the courts to police. Given the choice I might draw the bounds of the override more narrowly.
However, my biggest concern is that, while I think an override power would be better than the current system if you were starting from a blank slate, effecting this sort of change at this point in time runs you into path dependence problems. Some commentators (such as Mark Tushnet) have argued (IMHO convinvincgly) that one of the effects of judicial rights review of legislation has been that Congress has been far more willing to pass legislation that potentially breaches individuals' rights - on the theory that "we don't have to think about it, because if it's wrong, the courts will strike it down". Despite my initial preference for democracy, it seems rather dangerous to entrust a body with this sort of attitude with the task of rights defender. Thus, while I would be inclined to trust Canadian, or British, or New Zealand legislatures with a veto power, I'm not sure I can say the same of the US Congress. (I suspect part of my trust in the Commonwealth parliaments here also stems from the more seculra environments in which they operate, which in my view makes it easier for them to respect rights, but I'd still have qualms regardless.)